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test is still undecided. However, Maryland has indicated that it will follow
the Mace case and give conclusive weight to blood tests in paternity
cases. The court of appeals commented in Shanks v. State,37 that in
bastardy prosecutions: "[T]he non-scientific evidence is often quite un-
reliable and scientific evidence may be conclusive as to non-paternity.,38
Similarly, there was dicta in Beach v. Beach 9 that the District of Colum-
bia will make the tests conclusive. The rule also was recognized in United
States v. Shaughnessy.40
In view of the stature of the states adopting the rule that the blood
tests are conclusive to establish non-paternity if properly made, it seems
to follow that the rest of the states likewise will follow this rule. But the
question remains, will these states wait for decisions like the Chaplin,
Johnson and Prochnow decisions before, either through their courts or
their legislature, they adopt this rule.
87 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945).
38 Ibid., at 449, 90.
39 114 F.2d 479 (C.A.D.C., 1940).
40 115 F.Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y., 1953).
EQUITY-RESTRICTIVE COVENANT ON CHATTEL
BINDING ON THIRD PARTY WITH NOTICE
Plaintiff, a dealer in damaged goods, agreed with a carrier not to permit
fruit salad which had become frozen in transit to enter retail outlets under
the original brand name label. The carrier notified the plaintiff that a
violation of their agreement would result in a severance of further
business relations with the carrier, one of its principal customers. The
plaintiff then resold the goods to a third party. Subsequently, the de-
fendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, who had participated in the
transactions, purchased the goods from the third party and began their
sale under the original brand name label without regard to the sales re-
striction imposed by the plaintiff. In affirming the decree granting an
injunction, the court held that, having acquired the goods with the knowl-
edge of the restriction on their resale in the containers with the original
label, defendant was bound thereby. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d
505 (Cal. App., 1959).
Originally at common law, restraints on the alienation of property were
considered void.' Equitable servitudes on realty binding subsequent pur-
chasers with notice of the restrictions were first upheld in Tulk v. Mox-
I Coke's Institutes, Vol. 2, p. 21 (1836).
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bay,2 but servitudes on personalty did not fare as well. This difficulty
was apparently due to the struggle to find a dominant tenement to which
the benefit of the servitude could attach.3
About ten years after Tulk v. Moxhay, Lord Justice Knight Bruce in
De Mattos v. Gibson,4 relied on by the principal case, announced the
broad principle that where property, either movable or immovable, is
disposed of with notice of a prior contract entered into by the transferor
for its use in a particular manner, the transferee taking it with such
notice may be restrained from using it otherwise.5 This principle has
generally been repudiated in the United States where the rule appears to
be that equity is reluctant to enforce equitable servitudes on personalty
against subsequent transferees either with or without notice6 because "...
they offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels...
which pass by mere delivery."7 Moreover, the courts feel that the right
to alienate is an essential incident of the property right in chattels,8 and
that "... a covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run
with or attach itself to a mere chattel."9 Consequently, Professor Chafee
has summarized the doctrine as "at best it remains a struggling equitable
conception which may disappear altogether."' 0
Overcoming this lack of precedent, the principal case found that the
plaintiff had a proprietary interest in the chattels for the benefit of his
business and that this should be regarded as the dominant tenement of an
equitable servitude." This result coincides with the true nature of the
rule in Tulk v. Moxhay that "any interest of a proprietary nature in the
beneficial enjoyment of the covenant suffices to support its enforce-
ment .... "12
22 Phil. Ch. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
8Lord Strathcona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., [1926] A.C. 108, 121, 122;
Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
4 4 De. G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108 (1859).
5 De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De. G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108 (1858); In re Waterson,
Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704 (C.CA.2d, 1931).
6 Miles Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); In re Consolidated Factors Corp.,
46 F.2d 561 (1931); Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 6th, 1907); Na-
tional Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 110 N.J.Eq. 18, 158 At. 736 (1932).
7 Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (C.CA. 6th, 1907).
8 Consult Chafee, Equitable Servitudes On Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1928).
9 Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (C.CA. 6th, 1907).
10 Chafee, Equitable Servitudes On Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 956 (1928).
11 Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d 505 (Cal. App., 1959).
"2 Wade, Restrictions On User, 44 L. Q. Rev. 51, 65 (1928) (emphasis supplied).
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Generally, five classes of restrictions have been utilized. 13 While re-
strictions on territory and resale price may be objected to on the ground
that they are chiefly aimed at increasing the covenantee's profits, 14 re-
strictions on the form in which the article may be resold are beneficial to
the public. Essentially the covenantee is not directly motivated by the
dollar sign here, but is aware that:
The public has been familiarized through pictorial advertising and personal
observation with a standardized type and size of package, and the appearance
of the article on a retailer's counter in a different form will have a demoralizing
effect on its selling powers. The public will begin to think that the manu-
facturer has authorized the resale of his goods in a manner which facilitates
uncleanliness or adulteration with inferior materials .... A serious loss of good
will is bound to follow.15
A similar agreement in P. Lorillard v. Weingarden,16 followed by the
Nadell case, was enforced. There, the covenant prohibited the sale of a
lot of stale cigarettes in this country since good cigarettes of the same
brand were being sold here. The court, without citing a single case in
support of its decision, granted an injunction against a subsequent pur-
chaser with notice on the ground that equity will enforce a restrictive
covenant if reasonable.
Inasmuch as previous cases upholding restrictions on chattels have pri-
marily involved the infringement of copyrights,' and Fair Trade Laws,'8
the Nadell and Lorillard decisions indicate that equity, which has recog-
nized that the owner of a business has a proprietary interest therein,1 9
will enforce equitable servitudes on chattels binding subsequent purchas-
ers with notice where the only effect of the covenant is to keep a particu-
lar mass of damaged, adulterated, or inferior goods off a market in which
standard quality goods of the same brand are being offered for sale with-
out restrictions. 20 Thus where a plaintiff is faced with a serious loss of
"United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) (tying clauses);
Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 6th, 1907) (restriction on resale
price); P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y., 1922) (restriction on
use of the chattel itself); National Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 110 N.J.Eq. 18, 158 Ad.
736 (1932) (restriction on territory); Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d 505 (Cal. App.,
1959) (restriction on form in which chattel may be resold).
14 Chafee, Equitable Servitudes On Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1928).
15 Ibid., at 949.
16280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y., 1922).
17In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704 (C.C.A.2d, 1931).
18 Max Factor Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936).
19 John Brothers Abergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes, 1 Ch. 188 (1900).
20p. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y., 1922). Consult 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 107 (1922).
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good will to his business if the goods are sold in a form or way which is
contrary to his restriction, equitable machinery will enjoin the offender.
Just as modern needs have brought about servitudes on land unknown
to the common law, they may also call for a limited departure from the
free alienation of personalty for the purpose of promoting desirable busi-
ness practices completely foreign to the common law.
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT-STATE LAW NOT
BINDING ON FEDERAL COURT IN
DIVERSITY SUIT
The plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, ordered thirty-six pieces of
a certain style of wool from the defendant, a New York corporation. The
final written contract contained a clause providing that "any complaint,
controversy, or question which may arise with respect to this contract
that cannot be settled by the parties thereto, shall be referred to arbitra-
tion. . . ." Delivery of the goods was made from New York to Boston,
and the plaintiff found latent defects in the goods which did not prove to
be the quality called for by the contract (plaintiff's version of fraud). In
an action for damages for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made by
the defendant inducing the plaintiff to purchase the woolen fabric, the
district court denied a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. The court
of appeals reversed with a direction to grant the stay. The court of ap-
peals found that the Federal Arbitration Act' was a declaration of na-
tional law binding upon federal courts when jurisdiction is based solely
upon diversity of citizenship. Lawrence v. Devonshire, 271 F.2d 402
(C.A.2d, 1959).
"Maritime transactions" and transactions affecting "commerce," with
the exception of employment contracts, come within the operation of the
Federal Arbitration Act.2 Written provisions for arbitration in maritime
transactions and transactions affecting commerce are made valid, irrevoca-
ble and enforceable. 3 However, such arbitration agreements are not
grounds to make the transaction a federal question.4 Therefore, the ques-
tion of arbitration will not be raised in a federal court unless jurisdiction
is predicated on the judicial code. If a federal court has jurisdiction sep-
arate and apart from the arbitration agreement, and if the arbitration
agreement otherwise comes within the scope of the Act, then a stay of
the proceedings for purposes of arbitration will be granted upon applica-
tion of one of the parties. 5 In substance, these are the provisions of the
19 U.S.C.A. S§ 1 to 14 (Supp., 1959).
29 U.S.C.A. § I (Supp., 1959). 3 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp., 1959).
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 4,8 (Supp., 1959). 5 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (Supp., 1959).
